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This article begins by first focusing on the Tokyo IMT’s heritage of
collective forgetting in relation to instances of systematized violence
against women, especially the establishment of comfort stations in
territories formerly occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army. In specific,
after the Introduction, it describes the international political, legal and
military factors that led to the formation of the Tokyo IMT; a brief
overview of the trial; the political and pedagogical functions of the Tokyo
IMT; and legal and extra-legal devices of the Tokyo IMT. Subsequently, it
points out key differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, in
terms of their legal and political strategies and aims. From there, it
analyzes the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of forgetting crimes of violence against
women, especially the crimes against the comfort women, which included
a collusion of amnesia imposed by the Allied powers with the Japanese
Imperial government, through the exploitation of various legal loopholes
in international law. From there, it moves from the Tokyo IMT’s specific
history to a broader analysis of the functions of crimes of violence against
women during wartime conditions in the twentieth century and why such
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crimes, for the most part, have been invisible. To close, the article
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various ways in which women
suffering such wartime crimes of violence, inclusive of the comfort women,
may seek redress for such crimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]f the dead from [the Rape of] Nanking were to link
hands, they would stretch from Nanking to the city of
Hanchow, spanning a distance of some two hundred miles.
Their blood would weigh twelve hundred tons, and their
bodies would fill twenty-five hundred railroad cars.
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Stacked on top of each other, these bodies would reach the
height of a seventy-four-story building.1
There is no dearth of images representing the Holocaust; in fact, images
from the Holocaust have become so ubiquitous that they have achieved
the status of a form of visual rhetoric—a call to action against gross
human rights violations.2 Unlike the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg IMT), which has been iconized and epideictically
represented through Hollywood movies3 and television mini-series,4 the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the Tokyo
IMT) has left comparatively few traces, both in historical and legal texts,5
and in popular culture.
Marita Sturken remarks:
The process of history making is highly complex, one that
takes place in the United States through a variety of
cultural arenas, including the media, Hollywood narrative
films, and museums in addition to the academy. That
means that memories, artifacts, images and events often
get marked as historical without the aid of historians.6
Even “historical” films that have the “look” of “authenticity,” such as
Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, 7 appropriate narrative techniques derived
from horror such as Hitchcock’s “shower scene” from Psycho, 8 and
exploit the stock characters of the hyperfeminized, vulnerable Jewess and
the hypermasculinized monstrous Nazi male officer. 9
Such
“commodification of suffering” 10 may be understood as a part of the
1

IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING 5 (1997).
For example, Richard Raskin tracks the image of the Jewish child held at gunpoint by
Nazi soldiers from its historical context to its incorporation into a number of works of art
and appropriation into the “war of images” in the Middle East. See RICHARD RASKIN, A
CHILD AT GUNPOINT: A CASE STUDY IN THE LIFE OF A PHOTO (2004).
3
JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Roxlom Films Inc. 1963).
4
NUREMBERG (Alliance Atlantis Commc’ns et al. 2000).
5
See, e.g., RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE (reprt. 2001) (1971); B.V.A. RÖLING,
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993).
6
Marita Sturken, Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese
Internment, in PERILOUS MEMORIES 33–34 (T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White & Lisa
Yoneyama eds., 2001).
7
Schindler’s List (Universal Pictures, et. al., 1993).
8
Psycho (Shamley Productions, et. al., 1960).
9
CAROLINE JOAN (KAY) S. PICART & DAVID A. FRANK, FRAMES OF EVIL: THE HOLOCAUST
AS HORROR IN AMERICAN FILM 36–69 (2006).
10
“[T]he cultural capital of trauma victims—their wounds, their scars, their tragedy—is
appropriated by the same popular codes through which physical and sexual violence is
commodified, sold in the cinema, marketed as pornography, and used by tabloids and
novelists to attract readers.” Arthur Kleinman & Joan Kleinman, The Appeal of
2
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complex, non-linear process of collectively attempting to “work
through,”11 or come to terms with, the trauma of the Holocaust. Yet when
traces of memory have been suppressed, as if in a collectively agreedupon amnesia, as they have been, in the case of the Tokyo IMT,12 it is
more difficult to work through that trauma. This is an attempt to work
through the legacy of the Tokyo IMT, which has usually been either
conflated with, or dismissed as simply corollary to, the Nuremberg IMT—
a mistake that has far-reaching consequences, both legally and politically.
This article begins by first focusing on the Tokyo IMT’s heritage
of collective forgetting in relation to instances of systematized violence
against women, especially the establishment of comfort stations in
territories formerly occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army. In specific,
after the Introduction, Part II describes the international political, legal and
military factors that led to the formation of the Tokyo IMT; a brief
overview of the trial; the political and pedagogical functions of the Tokyo
IMT; and legal and extra-legal devices of the Tokyo IMT. Subsequently,
Part III points out key differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Trials, in terms of their legal and political strategies and aims. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of forgetting crimes of violence
against women, especially the crimes against the comfort women, which
included a collusion of amnesia imposed by the Allied powers with the
Japanese Imperial government, through the exploitation of various legal
loopholes in international law. From there, Parts V and VI move from the
Tokyo IMT’s specific history to a broader analysis of the functions of
crimes of violence against women during wartime conditions in the
twentieth century, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
and contemplate why such crimes, for the most part, have been not only
difficult to prosecute, but have remained invisible. To close, the article
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various ways in which such
wartime crimes of violence against women, inclusive of the case of the
comfort women, may seek redress. Though the case of the comfort
women has remained without a legal solution, there have been successes
in the cases of Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone that
could suggest useful strategies for litigating institutionalized sexual

Experience; The Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times in
SOCIAL SUFFERING 10–11 (Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das & Margaret Lock eds., 1997).
11
“Working-through implies the possibility of judgment that is not apodictic or ad
hominem but argumentative, self-questioning, and related in mediated ways to action. In
this sense, it is bound up with the role of distinctions that are not purely binary oppositions
but marked by varying and contestable degrees of strength or weakness.” DOMINICK
LACAPRA, REPRESENTING THE HOLOCAUST: HISTORY, THEORY, TRAUMA 210 (1994).
12
The imagery of absence or forgetting is ubiquitous in relation to the Tokyo IMT: “[T]he
proceedings in Tokyo have become an all but forgotten chapter in the history of
interpreting.” KAYOKO TAKEDA, INTERPRETING THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 8 (2010).
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slavery and other crimes of violence against women during wartime
conditions.

II. THE NATURE OF THE TOKYO IMT
A. The Road to Prosecution and a Jurisdictional Postscript
As World War II drew to a close, on July 26, 1945, the United
States, the United Kingdom and China met and issued the Potsdam
Declaration regarding the terms of Japanese surrender.13 Much like the
Agreement and Charter which authorized the Nuremberg IMT (hereinafter,
collectively, the “Nuremberg Charter”), with their heavy didactic
emphasis,14 the Potsdam Declaration declared that “stern justice” was to
be “meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited
cruelties upon . . . prisoners.”15 As with the Nuremberg IMT, the legal
basis for the Tokyo IMT was military. After the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, Emperor Hirohito’s
surrender was announced on August 15; but the official ending of wartime
hostilities came only when representatives of the Japanese government
signed the Instrument of Surrender on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo
Bay on September 2, 1945.16 Simultaneously, the Instrument of Surrender
subjected the Emperor and the Japanese government to the authority of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan—U.S. General
Douglas MacArthur—who essentially shaped policy in relation to
procedures regarding war crimes prosecutions and the occupation of
Japan.17 Japan’s occupation began when General MacArthur arrived on
August 30, 1945.18
On September 11, 1945, MacArthur authorized the arrests of
thirty nine prominent war crimes suspects, including the former Prime
Minister and War Minister, General Hideki Tōjō.19 Within several months,
approximately one hundred individuals had been detained at the Sugamo
prison in Tokyo20 as suspected “Class-A war criminals,”21 or “major war
13

Id. at 10.
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 472 E.A.S. 1, 1, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 280 (“[T]hose German
Officers . . . who have been responsible for . . . atrocities and crimes will be sent back to
the countries in which their abominable deeds were done . . . .”).
15
Proclamation of Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), ¶ 10, July 26,
1945, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 (1968).
16
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 10.
17
MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 52 (2008).
18
Id.
19
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 11.
20
Id.
21
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53.
14
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criminals” 22 for committing “crimes against peace.” 23 The Tokyo
Tribunal was created based on the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the “Tokyo Charter”), which was
issued on January 19, 1946;24 the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East was modeled on the Nuremberg Charter, and
included prosecution for crimes against peace, conventional war crimes
and crimes against humanity as its jurisdictional grounds.25
Although the Nuremberg Charter had already been announced on
August 8, the Tokyo Charter took months to develop. In the meantime,
President Harry S. Truman appointed Joseph Keenan, formerly the leader
of the U.S. Justice Department’s criminal division, as the chief prosecutor
for the Tokyo Trial.26 Keenan arrived in Japan on December 6, 1945,
accompanied by an army of forty lawyers and aides.27 In considerable
contrast with Nuremberg, where the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union each sent its own prosecution team, here
there was simply one consolidated team led by Keenan, incorporating
representatives from the eleven Allied countries.28 On December 8, 1945,
the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor according to the
Japanese calendar, the International Prosecution Section was established.29
It was only after the International Prosecution Section was in place that
the Tokyo Charter was established, drafted by the U.S. prosecution team,
and approved and announced by MacArthur.30 The Tokyo Charter was
later amended through consultations with the other Allied countries.31
With the Tokyo Charter officially in place, each of the nine
signatories to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender nominated a judge, but
it was General MacArthur who appointed these judges on February 15,
1946.32 The tribunal was comprised of eleven judges: one from each of
the Instrument’s nine signatories (Australia, Canada, China, France, Great
Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union and the United
States) and, after MacArthur amended the Tokyo Charter on April 26,
1946 in response to a call from the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied
Powers’ highest policy-making agency for the occupation of Japan,33 India
and the Philippines, each of which were also represented in the
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 11.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 12.
33
Id.
23
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prosecution.34 Although Sir William Webb, the Australian judge, was
vulnerable to charges of bias based on his prior position as the chief
investigator for atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army
against Australian prisoners of war, he became the President of the
Tribunal, and remained in that post for the duration of the trial.35
In March, 1946, selections of the accused began, and on April 29,
1946, indictments were issued for twenty eight defendants.36 Among
these were former general and Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and seventeen
other military officers. 37 Four of the defendants were former prime
ministers, and most of the rest had been members of wartime cabinets.38
Seven of the accused, at the end of the trial, filed motions with the
U.S. Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.39
In terms of jurisdiction, the petitioners claimed that the Tokyo Tribunal
was a U.S. military tribunal over which the U.S. Supreme Court had
jurisdiction, and that the U.S. executive branch had overstepped its
boundaries by establishing a court and legislating crimes—something the
U.S. Constitution reserved for Congress.40 The petitioners claimed that an
unauthorized crime was being prosecuted through an unauthorized
procedure, which would thus give the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction to
grant habeas corpus.41 They also argued that there was no treaty basis for
the Tokyo Tribunal.42 These arguments were dismissed by the Supreme
Court, as stated in full below:
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States. The
United States and other allied countries conquered and
now occupy and control Japan.
General Douglas
MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. The military tribunal
sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General
MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers. Under the
foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States
34

FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53.
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 12.
36
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876–81 (1948) (agreeing to hear arguments). The seven
petitioners were Hirota, Dohihara, Kido, Oka, Sato, Shimada, and Togo.
40
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER,
THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 29 (2008).
41
Id.
42
Id.
35
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have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside
or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these
petitioners and for this reason the motions for leave to file
petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.43

Justice Douglas, although he concurred, expressed some
cautionary thoughts regarding setting a precedent of refusing to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction over the Tokyo IMT because it left no basis
for judicial scrutiny of this type of tribunal, essentially giving the Tokyo
IMT absolute power.44 Douglas stated that prisoners under the Tokyo
IMT’s mandates had no recourse for appeal, and doubted that his
colleagues would have affirmed such a state of affairs had the prisoners
been U.S. citizens.45 Nevertheless, the majority clearly agreed with the
Tokyo IMT, which stated in its judgment that “[t]he Tribunal was
established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st
of December 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July 1945,
the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of December 1945, and the
Moscow Conference of the 26th of December 1945.” 46 Whatever
controversies arose regarding the validity of the Tokyo IMT as an
international tribunal, what is clear is that the chief justification for its
existence is found in Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration; it is this
item as well that ironically paves the way for the eventual “forgetting” of
many of Japan’s WWII atrocities during the Cold War realignment of
powers. Stated in full, Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration reads as
follows:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a
race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have
visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the
Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of
thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human
rights shall be established.47

43

Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).
Id. at 205.
45
Id.
46
BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 40, at 31.
47
Proclamation of Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), ¶ 10, July 26,
1945, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 (1968).
44
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B. The Trial: A Brief Overview
On April 29, 1946, twenty eight “Class A” defendants, all of
whom had been Japanese military and political leaders during WWII,
were indicted of “crimes against peace (Class A),” “conventional crimes
(Class B)” and “crimes against humanity (Class C).” 48 In spite of
reservations expressed by, for example, Australia, the Allied Powers
ultimately agreed, as Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration had
implied, to protect Emperor Hirohito from prosecution and to place the
blame purely on the shoulders of his military and political subordinates.49
We shall return to the corollary effects of this decision later.
The Tokyo Trial opened on May 3, 1946, with Sir William
Webb’s much quoted statement that “there has been no more important
criminal trial in all history.”50 The case for the prosecution lasted until
January 24, 1947.51 The prosecution charged that:
[T]he accused participated in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to wage declared or
undeclared war or wars of aggression and war or wars in
violation of international law, treaties, agreements and
assurances against any country which might oppose
them . . . with the object of securing military, naval,
political and economic domination of East Asia and of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all countries bordering
thereon and islands therein and ultimately the domination
of the world.52
The prosecution also raised concerns about war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and included a section developed against individual
defendants.53
Along a parallel track to the Nuremberg Trial, during the
presentation of the prosecution’s case, the defense team was allowed to
raise a motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tokyo IMT. Briefly
summarized, the defense characterized the tribunal as constituting ex post
facto legislation (i.e., as defining and punishing crimes ex post facto),
because the Potsdam Declaration referred specifically to war crimes, and
48

TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Joseph Keenan, Prosecution Opening Statement (June 4, 1946) in 1 THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES 435, (R.J. Pritchard &
S.M. Zaide eds., 1981) [hereinafter THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL].
53
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53.
49
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did not mention crimes against peace or crimes against humanity. 54
Additionally, the defense team argued that because the Potsdam
Declaration limited the jurisdiction of the tribunal to the Pacific War, any
charges unassociated with the war, or that had already been settled, were
beyond the Tokyo IMT’s jurisdiction. 55 Finally, the defense raised
additional claims: that a tribunal composed of representatives of victors
over Japan in WWII
can be neither fair, legal nor impartial; [that] war is not a
crime; 56 [that] individuals may not be charged with
54

Id. The ex post facto defense was presented both at Nuremberg and Tokyo and failed in
both trials for similar reasons: (i) that murder, assault and torture were illegal at
international law, (ii) terms such as “crimes of humanity” or “genocide” were novel, but
only because society had not previously conceived of such systematic killing, and (iii)
international law needed to evolve, and be able to go within the borders of sovereign states
to protect their people from government abuse. This last point suggested that individuals
rather than states could be the proper targets of international legal prosecution. See Otto
Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 339–342
(1965); Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg’s Architect and Advocate, 68
ALBANY L. REV. 55, 59–60 (2004). Finally, Henry Stimson gives a passionate defense
against the charge of ex post facto law; and appeals for the general fairness of the trials and
the punishments. For Stimson, the charge of ex post facto law assumes “that if the
defendant had known the proposed act was criminal he would have refrained from
committing it. [But] [n]othing in the attitude of the Nazi leaders corresponds to this
assumption; their minds were wholly untroubled by the question of their guilt or
innocence . . . .” Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN
AFF. 179, 183 (1947). Furthermore, Stimson argues that international law, like common
law, must not be viewed as static but as evolving, and thus, Nuremberg was “a new judicial
process . . . not ex post facto law . . . [but rather] the enforcement of a [universal] moral
judgment [on the part of human society] which date[d] back a generation” to the Kellogg
Pact. Id. at 184–85.
55
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53.
56
This was also a problem at Nuremberg because the trials were consciously staged in
Germany as “historical” trials—meaning trials with a clear “political aspect.” See
Kranzbuhler, supra note 54, at 334–35. Similarly, Kranzbuhler also mounts another
devastating critique regarding the violation of the principle of separating executive from
judicial powers at Nuremberg: “two of the legislators of the London Charter . . . the
American, Jackson, and a Britisher, Sir David Maxwell Fyffe, acted as chief prosecutors,
thus part of the executive power, while two other legislators of the London Charter, a
Frenchman, Falco, and a Russian, Nikichenkow, reappeared at Nuremberg in the capacity
of judges. By this personal overlapping, the doctrine of separation of powers was grossly
neglected and thus the authority of the administration of justice greatly impaired from the
very outset.” Id. at 338. Judge Röling, like Judge Pal, was also critical of the idea that
crimes against peace existed prior to and during World War II because he did not see the
Kellogg-Briand Pact as a criminal statute; nor did he see its provisions as sufficiently
determinate to determine what was “aggressive” versus “self-defensive.” Nevertheless,
rather than side with Judge Pal, he concurred with the majority regarding the legality of the
charges but established a different legal basis for it:
There is no doubt that powers victorious in a ‘bellum justum’ and as
such responsible for peace and order thereafter, have, according to
international law, the right to counteract elements constituting a threat
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responsibility for wars; [that] killing in war is not murder
follows from the fact that war is legal; and [that]
violations of the laws and customs of war are punishable
by a trial by a military commission but not by an
international military tribunal . . . .57
The prosecution responded by pointing out the significance of
international law that was already in place, and the unconditional nature of
Japan’s surrender.58 At this stage, the President of the Tribunal dismissed
the defense motions “for reasons to be given later.”59
The case for the defense arguments followed and lasted until
January 12, 1947.60 The defense’s presentation consisted of five parts,
covering “general problems, relations with Manchuria and Manchukuo,
with China, with the Soviet Union and the Pacific War.”61 The defense
had two aims: first, principally, to claim that “all of the acts committed by
the defendants and the government of Japan were acts of self-defense
against provocative acts of other nations threatening and interfering with
Japan’s recognized and legitimate rights in Asia and her right of national
existence,” and second, to deny “the existence of the conspiracy and joint
action by the defendants in committing crimes against peace.” 62
Individual defenses followed (ending on January 12, 1948),63 which in
turn were followed by “rebuttal, surrebuttal, prosecution summation,
defense summation and prosecution reply”64 (ending in April, 1948).65
The Tokyo Trial is noteworthy for its length and complexity, doubling the
number of witnesses, sessions, and duration of the proceedings of the
Nuremberg Trial: 419 witnesses testified; there were 4,336 documents
accepted as evidentiary exhibits; the transcript was 48,412 pages long.66 In
contrast, the Nuremberg Trial ended in less than one year.67

to that newly established order, and are entitled, as a means of
preventing the recurrence of gravely offensive conduct to seek and
retain the custody of the pertinent persons[.]
Robert Cryer, Röling in Tokyo: A Dignified Dissenter, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1109, 1115–
16 (2010).
57
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53–54.
58
Id. at 54.
59
1 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 52, at 319.
60
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 13.
61
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54.
62
Id.
63
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 13.
64
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54.
65
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 13.
66
FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54.
67
TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 13.
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To illustrate the tortuousness of the proceedings, at the Tokyo
IMT, the eleven judges took seven months to write the judgment, and it
took eight days to read out, starting on November 4, 1948.68 During the
trial, two of the defendants died of natural causes; one underwent a mental
breakdown and was found incompetent to stand trial.69 But the remaining
twenty five were found guilty by the majority; judges from the Philippines,
France, the Netherlands and India, as well as the president of the tribunal,
Judge Webb, submitted separate dissenting opinions.70 Although nine of
the eleven judges signed the majority decision, five judges wrote separate
opinions, which included dissents by the French judge, Henri Bernard, and
the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal.71 Judge Pal’s 1,235 page dissent was
strikingly different: he argued against the majority opinion, stating that
the Tokyo Trial was ex post facto legislation; that there was no evidence
of a conspiracy in Japanese foreign policy during the 1930s and 1940s;
that Japan had simply fought a defensive war; and that therefore all
defendants should have been acquitted. 72 However, probably in the
interest of expediency given the length of the trial, none of the dissenting
opinions were read from the bench.73
Seven out of the twenty five defendants found guilty, including
General Tōjō, were sentenced to death by hanging; 74 sixteen were
sentenced to life imprisonment, one to twenty years’ imprisonment, and
one to seven years’ imprisonment.75 It was at this point that the Tribunal
responded to the defense’s motions, rejecting the defense challenges that:
aggressive war was not a crime; there was no individual accountability for
war; and the Tokyo Charter constituted illegitimate ex post facto
legislation. 76 The Tokyo Tribunal grounded its reasoning on the
Nuremberg IMT’s judgment of October 1946, echoing the former’s
statements that “[t]he Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the
part of the victorious nations but is the expression of international law
existing at the time of its creation.” 77 The Tokyo IMT, like the
Nuremberg IMT, also rejected the “victor’s justice” argument—that a
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judicial body composed of representatives from the victorious nations was
incapable of impartiality and fairness.78
Some scholars have argued that the Tokyo Trial, in comparison to
the Nuremberg Trial, was a grandly staged “third-string road company of
the Nuremberg show.”79 Numerous reasons abound to explain why the
Tokyo Trial is remembered in a less flattering light than the Nuremberg
Trial.80 Boister and Cryer decry the Tokyo IMT’s “at times cavalier
approach to individual liability” 81 in its reliance on a conspiracy-led
narrative that resulted in what David Cohen describes as the Tokyo IMT’s
“drift from the individual to the collective.”82 The result, according to
78
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Boister, was the infinite expansion of responsibility for crimes of
aggression at the Tokyo IMT, and thus, their “over-criminalization.”83
The “ironic” or “paradoxical” result of this strategy of turning an entire
class of leaders into scapegoats, was to absolve a still larger class, that of
the polity at large, from responsibility for the war or from the crimes
committed in connection with it. Thus, many Japanese, unlike most
Germans, ended up feeling no guilt or responsibility for the crimes
committed by their country and by their countrymen during the Second
World War.84
Yet, as Kirsten Sellars argues in Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg
and Tokyo, the Tokyo IMT must also be viewed within the context of the
backlash against the Nuremberg IMT’s Charter and Indictment, and
especially the most critically-reviewed category of charges, that of
“crimes against peace.”85 In her review of Boister and Cryer’s work,
Sellars notes that Tokyo became a “catalyst for debate about the future of
international law.” 86 In reviewing the dissent of Judge Pal, who
“famously absolved the Japanese defendants of all guilt,” and the broader
background of dissent and criticism which had marked the reception of the
Nuremberg Trial by contemporary jurists, Sellars contends that “[t]he
prosecuting powers were well aware” that the “crimes against peace”
charge had been found wanting on legal grounds, and “hoped that the
Tokyo Judgment would confirm Nuremberg’s determinations on
aggressive war, thereby settling the debate.”87 The inadvertent result of
this effort to shore up Nuremberg was that the crimes that had formed the
moral core of the Nuremberg IMT’s Indictment, “crimes against
humanity,” and their accompanying evidence in the form of riveting
footage of Holocaust camps, were eclipsed. Thus, whereas Germany’s
crimes came to be viewed as “exceptional,” Japan’s became framed as
“unexceptional.” 88 The popular inference drawn, and the eventual
83
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patrimony resulting, were that although Japan “had certainly presided over
wholesale assaults and terrible atrocities . . . they had not broken the
mould of international politics by instituting polices to systematically
annihilate entire national, ethnic, racial or religious groups.”89 Again, this
helps explain another basis for the Tokyo IMT’s tragic heritage of
amnesia and denial.
On November 24, 1948, General MacArthur, operating under the
legitimizing aegis of the Tokyo Charter, confirmed the judgment of the
Tokyo Tribunal.90 However, there was a temporary stay of execution
while the defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for writs of
habeas corpus; they appealed on November 29, 1948,91 and that appeal, as
discussed supra, was dismissed on December 20, 1948.92 The executions
were carried out inside Sugamo Prison on December 23, 1948. 93
Ultimately, the Japanese government accepted the Tokyo Tribunal’s
decision in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951, which in
1952 ended the American occupation of Japan.94
C. The Purposes of the Tokyo Trial
The Tokyo IMT styled itself after the Nuremberg IMT, adopting
the same heavily didactic tone, and attempting to justify its holdings both
as principled judgments and as historical tutelage. For example, Robert
M.W. Kempner, one of the junior prosecutors at Nuremberg, described the
Nuremberg Trial as “the greatest history seminar ever held in the history
of the world.” 95 Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor,
remarked in a similar vein that the Nuremberg Trial would leave behind
“an authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn
for truth.”96 In a parallel way, Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan vividly
described his vision for the purpose of the Tokyo Trial:
Our purpose is one of prevention or deterrence. It has
nothing whatsoever to do with the small meaner purpose
of vengeance or retaliation. But we do hope in these
proceedings that it is neither impossible nor improbable
that the branding of individuals who visit these scourges
89
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upon mankind as common felons, and punishing them
accordingly, may have a deterring effect upon aggressive
warlike activities of their prototypes of the future, should
they arise.97

Thus, the Tokyo prosecution’s language was laced with grandiose didactic
metaphors, picturing the Tokyo IMT as the trial to “end all wars . . . [and]
part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the entire world
from destruction.”98
However, the Tokyo Trial’s strategic objectives were also
simultaneously aligned with the United States’ forward-looking policy
objectives regarding its occupation of Japan. These objectives were:
(a)
to insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and security of
the world;
(b)
to bring about the eventual establishment of a
peaceful and responsible government which will respect
the rights of other states and will support the objectives of
the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.99
The overarching and implicit goal was therefore to transform Japan,
through demilitarization and democratization, from being an enemy to an
ally, in anticipation of what eventually came to be called the Cold War
realignment. The United States, growing increasingly estranged from
China and from the U.S.S.R. for ideological reasons, foresaw that it would
be necessary to maintain friendly relations with Japan.100 In addition,
“after the 1949 Communist revolution in China, neither the People’s
Republic of China nor the Republic of China demanded wartime
reparations from Japan (as Israel had from Germany) because the two
governments were competing for Japanese trade and political
recognition.”101 The result, as we shall later see, has been a heritage of
convenient collective amnesia, both by the former Allies and by Japan.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the procedural devices of the
Tokyo IMT against the backdrop of the Nuremberg IMT, in order to
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assess how the Tokyo IMT achieved its objective of converting Japan
from a military enemy to a political and economic ally.102
D. Legal and Extra-Legal Devices of the Tokyo IMT
Similar to the Nuremberg IMT, the Tokyo IMT endorsed demilitarization
and democratization. And just as with Nuremberg, it was not enough
merely to punish the war criminals being tried. It was necessary to
convince the Japanese people that these war criminals deserved their
punishment. To accomplish this end, the Allies pursued two strategies:
first, pursuing the individual responsibilities of war criminals (as opposed
to arguing for a blanket indictment of Japan), and second, creating a
didactic historical record of the war and its associated war crimes.
1. Pursuing Individual Responsibility
Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration clearly described the Allied
goal of differentiating between the individual war criminals and the main
of the Japanese nation: “We do not intend that the Japanese shall be
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted
out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon
our prisoners.”103 In addition, Article 10 also provided the blueprint for
the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, which was closely tied
up with the strategy of individualizing (and thus de-collectivizing)
responsibility for Japan’s WWII crimes. “The Japanese Government shall
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic
tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion,
and of thought, as well as respect for . . . fundamental human rights shall
be established.”104 Yet it was Article 6 that clearly pointed a finger at
specific individuals and specifically contributed to the physical
demilitarization of Japan, which would later be constitutionalized, by
excising its former military leaders, whom it implied were malicious
deceivers and master manipulators:
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There must be eliminated for all time the authority and
influence of those who have deceived and misled the
people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we
insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will
be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from
the world.105

But physical demilitarization was just the first step; the next was
the psychological demilitarization of Japan, by rhetorically strengthening
a narrative of these insidious war criminals victimizing the hapless and
oblivious Japanese nation, and by emphasizing the legitimacy and fairness
of the Tokyo Trial. Keenan’s opening statement drove that point home:
We must reach the conclusion that the Japanese people
themselves were utterly within the power and forces of
these accused, and to such extent were its victims . . . .
[W]e would point out that the forces of occupation, who
have the full power under the terms of surrender to
implement its terms in such manner as they should see fit,
have given full opportunity to the Japanese people and to
the world to observe the fair manner in which the [trial] is
being conducted.106
Keenan’s rhetoric simultaneously poised him as the speaker both
for Japan’s external victims (in particular, China) and for those Japanese
who also suffered under its repressive regime. Keenan thus contrasted the
“[s]tern punishment imposed by orderly international tribunals”107 with
the probable “bloody purges”108 and “judicial lynchings”109 that outraged
non-Japanese and Japanese victims would enact, if justice were not meted
out to these war criminals. In taking this position, Keenan allegedly spoke
for the victims of the Japanese army during WWII. Yet what ultimately
emerged from the trial was the protection of U.S. interests in avenging the
attack on Pearl Harbor (as an initial step to rehabilitating its former
enemy), not the protection of the rights of civilians of other Asian nations
ravaged by Japan during WWII.110
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2. Creating a Historical Record
Clearly, the purpose of the Tokyo Trial was more than simply
punishment. The Tribunal focused on leaving behind a didactic legacy
and a specific historical narrative—one that was meant for future
generations, especially the Japanese. As the defense stated: “[t]he purpose
of the trial was to convince the Japanese people that their leaders misled
them into war.”111 Similarly, the Allied-controlled Japanese media in its
major newspapers “serialize[d] the history of the Pacific War, based on
the sources offered by General Headquarters, SCAP, the so-called GHQ”
headed by General MacArthur.112 The Japanese media’s story mimed the
narrative of the Tokyo Trial: that conniving militarists in the Japanese
government kept the truth from the Japanese nation, and had brutally
committed atrocities in China and the Philippines, particularly victimizing
Allied soldiers and locals.113
However, the trial was not meant only for the Japanese, but also
intended to appease the American public regarding the attack on Pearl
Harbor, and to justify why it had been necessary to drop two Atomic
bombs on Japan.114 As the Dutch judge, Bernard Victor Aloysius Röling,
said, “a trial was . . . desired to show the American people and the whole
world the criminal treachery of the attack on Hawaii.”115 Even more
importantly, for posterity’s sake, staging a trial, rather than a summary
execution, was important as an “ethical example of democracy, showing
that law and justice can be applied even to enemies through a fair trial.”116

III. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO
TRIALS
Although there are many similarities between the Nuremberg IMT
and the Tokyo IMT (especially given that the Tokyo Charter was based on
the Nuremberg Charter), there are also striking differences between them,
which help explain why there is a general silence regarding the gains of
the Tokyo IMT. These differences can be roughly grouped into three
subtopics: (i) issues of fairness and politics, (ii) the degree of involvement
of the United States in the Tokyo trial, and (iii) the prosecutorial strategy
of pursuing crimes against peace rather than crimes against humanity.
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A. Issues of Fairness and Politics
If the Nuremberg Trial has suffered from the reputation of being an
example of “victor’s justice,” the Tokyo Trial is viewed even more
ambivalently, as evidenced in the judges’ varying opinions at its
conclusion. For one thing, there was much negative feedback regarding
the trial’s lack of procedural fairness. For example, in terms of access to
lawyers familiar with the Anglo-American law of the Tribunal, the
prosecution was clearly privileged. The Japanese government requested
that General MacArthur provide British and American lawyers for the
defense.117 However, because British lawyers were prohibited by British
law from practicing in foreign jurisdictions, all fifteen attorneys eventually
allocated were provided solely by the United States, and in spite of urgent
requests, arrived two weeks after the beginning of the trial.118
In addition, out of 230 translators, 175 worked with the
prosecution and only 55 with the defense. The scope of their work
included “approximately 30,000 pages of exhibits” and “3,195 documents,
plus countless other statements . . . in English, Japanese, Chinese,
Annamese [that is, Vietnamese], Dutch, French, German, Italian, Malayan,
Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Burmese, Marshallese, Mongolian, Solomon
Island dialects, and Tho, a language used in northern French
Indochina.” 119 The defense’s concern over the lack of translators is
revealed in a letter, dated November 25, 1946, from the defense to a court
administrative officer: “[I]t would be a tremendous embarrassment to the
Supreme Commander [MacArthur], the Tribunal and the Defense
should . . . the Defense break down because of [an] inability to process
and clear those documents without undue delay.”120 Furthermore, initially,
the defense had only three translators to assist them, while the prosecution
had 102.121 Nevertheless, the prosecution’s mammoth translation team
also worked against it, contributing to, as Meirion and Susie Harries
hypothesize, “constant breaches of security,” that is to say, press leaks.122
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On the broader issue of the trial’s fairness, the question of whether
it or Nuremberg produced the harsher (arguably unduly harsh) sentences is
debatable, but there are good arguments in support of Tokyo.123 For
example, the Nuremberg Tribunal acquitted three, but the Tokyo Tribunal
acquitted no one.124 On the other hand, the Tokyo IMT sentenced only
seven out of twenty-five defendants to death, while the Nuremberg IMT
meted out the death sentence to twelve out of twenty defendants.125 But as
Richard Minear points out, when death and life-imprisonment sentences
are combined, the Tokyo trial seems more punitive; it so sentenced
twenty-three out of twenty-five accused individuals, while the Nuremberg
trial sentenced fifteen out of twenty-two.126 Ultimately, the legitimacy of
the Tokyo IMT was clouded by statements from some of its judges
concerning the unnecessary harshness of some of its sentences.127 In some
ways, more memorable than the majority opinion was the 1,235-page
dissent of the Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal.128 Judge Pal argued that
every defendant ought to be acquitted, (i) because the Tokyo Trial was “ex
post facto legislation,” (ii) because “there was no evidence . . . of a
conspiracy in Japanese foreign policy during [the] 1930s and 1940s,” and
(iii) because Japan’s wars had simply been in “self-defense” rather than
motivated by aggression.129 These arguments were later marshaled in
support of the claim that Japan’s war crimes had never happened, and that
the Tokyo IMT had been simply an unabashed instance of “victor’s
justice.”
Finally, in terms of politics, the Tokyo IMT bears a clearer
imprint of the shift in relations between the United States and the Soviet
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Union. The Nuremberg trial closed in October 1946,130 and by 1948 it
was clear that both the United States and Great Britain had lost enthusiasm
for any further prosecutions of Japanese Class A war criminals, given the
length of the Tokyo Trial. 131 Since by 1947 the objectives of
demilitarization and democratization seemed to have been sufficiently
achieved, the United States pivoted and sought to transform Japan into an
ally in the fight against communism in Asia.132 Thus, after General Tōjō
and others were executed on December 1948, nineteen Class A war crimes
suspects, initially held in custody in anticipation of a second round of
trials, were released.133 Shortly thereafter, in February 1949, General
MacArthur announced the official policy regarding ceasing prosecutions
against major war criminals in Japan.134 Emboldened by the shifting
political climate, in 1952, Japan requested several states to release their
war criminals, based on the premise that the formalization of peace could
give the issue of Japanese war crimes a political solution.135 Finally, by
the end of 1958, all former Allies, with the Communist exceptions of the
Soviet Union and China, had released their remaining Japanese prisoners,
including Class B and C war criminals.136 That political solution helped to
cement the Tokyo IMT’s heritage of collective amnesia.
B. The Degree of Involvement of the United States in the
Tokyo Trial
The United States, particularly in the form of General MacArthur,
clearly had a dominant hand in shaping the events surrounding the Tokyo
IMT, unlike the Nuremberg IMT. The Nuremberg Charter issued from
the London Agreement, which was a joint declaration by the United States,
France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and eventually ratified
by nineteen other countries.137 In contrast, General MacArthur, through
an executive decree, issued the Tokyo Charter.138 Furthermore, the Tokyo
Charter (though based on the Nuremberg Charter) was drafted by the
prosecution, which was staffed purely by American lawyers.139 As if that
were not egregious enough, the Tokyo Charter granted MacArthur the
authority to appoint the judges and the president of the tribunal, and to
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review their judgments.140 This is in sharp contrast to Nuremberg, where
the four Allied powers who had signed the London Agreement each
appointed their own judges, who in turn chose the president of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.141 Finally, unlike Nuremberg, where each of the
four signatories had their own chief prosecutors,142 at Tokyo, because the
United States had played a dominant role in the military defeat of Japan,
there was simply one chief prosecutor from the United States and ten
associate prosecutors from the other countries.143
Precisely because U.S. political interests shaped the unfolding of
the Tokyo Trial, there were several significant issues that were not
addressed. For example, the human experiments and biological warfare
research conducted by Unit 731 in Manchuria under Lieutenant General
Ishii Shiro, along with Japan’s alleged use of biological weapons in the
Chinese theater, were granted immunity in exchange for information.144 It
appears the United States wanted to monopolize the information on
biological warfare, and concealed it from the Soviet Union;145 as Judge
Röling points out with the benefit of hindsight, one defendant who
established a biological laboratory escaped a death sentence simply
because the Court was not informed of the relevant facts.146
Furthermore, principally because MacArthur strongly opposed the
indictment of the Japanese Emperor (even if the Japanese military had
waged war in his name), the Emperor was similarly granted immunity.147
As part of the U.S. strategy to rehabilitate and convert Japan into an ally,
the Japanese Emperor was shielded from prosecution in the hope of
preserving social order. In keeping with their own political interests, both
China and the Soviet Union agreed to go along in granting imperial
immunity; only Australia objected.148
Finally, ironically, many crimes committed in Asia were deemed
beyond the purview of the Tokyo IMT. Out of the eleven judges, only
three came from Asia: China, India and the Philippines, although it was
the Asian countries that had been ravaged by the Japanese army. 149
Although the Nanking Massacre was addressed to some extent,150 Japan’s
actions in Taiwan and Korea, areas which were under colonial rule, did
not come under scrutiny, leading to the question of why the Nazi atrocities
140
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against German Jews differed from these acts as crimes against
humanity.151 In sum, American and other Allied interests in securing the
post-war Pacific arena helped cement the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of
effacement and forgetfulness.
C. The Strategy of Pursuing Crimes Against Peace
Unlike the Nuremberg IMT, which had four counts for indictment
(conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity), the Tokyo IMT had a complicated 55 counts, which were
grouped into headings: “Crimes against peace (Group I: counts 1 to 36);
murder (Group II: counts 37 to 52); and conventional war crimes and
crimes against humanity (Group III: counts 53 to 55).”152 The procedure
of lumping together conventional war crimes with crimes against
humanity, de facto, caused crimes against humanity to disappear into war
crimes, giving the impression that the Japanese crimes were somehow not
as heinous as the Nazi atrocities—a position that is problematic, as we
have seen earlier.153
The Tokyo Trial appeared to focus more on crimes against peace
than on crimes against humanity, for “no defendant was prosecuted
without a charge of committing crimes against peace.”154 Although no
one was given a death sentence for conspiracy and crimes against peace
alone, at Tokyo, “22 defendants out of 25 were found guilty of at least one
count in the category of crimes against peace, while in Nuremberg, 16 out
of 22 defendants were charged for crimes against peace and 12 were found
guilty.”155
However, the more important aftermath of choosing to pursue
crimes against peace, as opposed to crimes against humanity, was that it
led to controversy and confusion. Crimes against peace, which hinged on
whether the war had been “aggressive” or simply “defensive,” constituted
a more contested legal category than conventional war crimes and crimes
against humanity.156 While the war in Europe clearly started with Nazi
aggression, there were conflicting narratives regarding whether Japan’s
war in the Pacific was purely aggressive or had an element of self-
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defense.157 Nevertheless, the net effect of focusing on crimes against
peace, as opposed to crimes against humanity, was to obscure the extent of
the Japanese atrocities during World War II. Unlike Nazi brutality, which
became the iconic image of inhumanity, Japanese crimes, especially
dealing with gender violence, were covered over, as part of the price of
converting Japan from enemy into ally, with the emerging Cold War
realignment of alliances. As Iris Chang points out:
After the 1949 Communist revolt in China, neither the
People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China
demanded wartime reparations from Japan (as Israel had
from Germany) because the two governments were
competing for Japanese trade and political recognition.
And even the United States, faced with the threat of
communism in the Soviet Union and mainland China,
sought to ensure the friendship and loyalty of its former
enemy, Japan.
In this manner, cold war tensions
permitted Japan to escape much of the intense critical
examination that its wartime ally [Germany] was forced to
undergo.158
Ironically, the U.S. strategy at the Tokyo IMT backfired: not only
has the trial become largely forgotten or remembered with shame, but it
has also been decried as a notoriously political “show trial” by the
majority of the Japanese, who felt collectively persecuted. 159 The result
was a psychologically complex reaction, which succeeding generations
imbibed: “While the Japanese . . . because of passive acceptance and
cynicism, remained as bystanders at the Tokyo Trial and did not take its
significance actively and personally . . . they, nonetheless, felt frustrated
that the trial blamed them collectively as a nation.”160 This complicated
mix of collective guilt and denial persists even today, and ironically, one
of the guiding principles behind the Tokyo IMT, designed to shield the
Japanese from collective responsibility, has been blamed for helping
generate a sense of “responsibility over past war crimes [that have] . . .
stretched out vertically and horizontally, growing into a timeless collective
responsibility.”161
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IV. THE TOKYO IMT’S LEGACY OF FORGETTING CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
A. Visualizing and Obliterating the Rape of Nanking
At the Tokyo Trial, atrocities committed by the Japanese were
revealed through a variety of sources: news reports, surveys, statistics,
and witness testimony. 162 The Tokyo IMT unearthed a pantheon of
horrible new ways of torturing human beings:
[O]f marches (such as the infamous Bataan Death March)
in which gravely ill and starved prisoners dropped dead
from exhaustion, of the savage conditions behind the
construction of the Siam-Burma Death Railway, of the
Japanese “water treatment” that pumped water or
kerosene into the noses and mouths of victims until their
bowels ruptured, of suspension of POWs by wrists, arms
or legs until their joints were literally ripped from their
sockets, of victims being forced to kneel on sharp
instruments, of excruciating extractions of nails from
fingers, of electric shock torture, of naked women forced
to sit on charcoal stoves, of every imaginable form of
beating and flogging . . . even of vivisection and
cannibalism.163
Chang claims that empirical studies show that the Japanese surpassed the
Nazis in their cruelty towards captives: “only one in twenty-five
American POWs died under Nazi captivity, in contrast to one in three
under the Japanese.”164
Yet the chief metaphor for Japanese atrocities, at the Tokyo IMT,
was the Rape of Nanking. Chang passionately argues for the uniqueness
of the brutality of Rape of Nanking, not only for the sheer number of
deaths, but also for the cruelty with which the deaths were executed.
[W]hether we use the most conservative number—
260,000—or the highest—350,000—it is shocking to
contemplate that the deaths at Nanking far exceeded the
deaths from the American raids on Tokyo (an estimated
80,000-120,000 deaths) and even the combined death toll
of the two atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the
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end of 1945 (estimated at 140,000 and 70,000
respectively).
...
Chinese men were used for bayonet practice and in
decapitation contests.
An estimated 20,000-80,000
Chinese women were raped. Many soldiers went beyond
rape to disembowel women, slice off their breasts, nail
them alive to walls. Fathers were forced to rape their
daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family
members watched. Not only did live burials, castration,
the carving of organs and the roasting of people become
routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, such
as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or
burying people to their waists and watching them get torn
apart by German shepherds. So sickening was the
spectacle that even the Nazis in the city were horrified,
one proclaiming the massacre to be the work of “bestial
machinery.”165
The Tokyo IMT unequivocally denounced the Rape of Nanking,
citing it as an instance of clear government policy, sanctioned by the
highest levels of government (except for the Emperor), which were
informed of the developments, and even celebrated the atrocities in Japan,
before international condemnation set in.
Chang claims in
commemoration of the victory over Nanking, special Nanking noodles
were prepared in Tokyo; 166 Japanese children proudly carried globeshaped, candle-lit paper lanterns in evening parades to symbolize Japanese
ascendancy; 167 photos of the atrocities committed were proudly
heralded.168 It was only after news of international outrage (interestingly,
more about the bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay, an American
gunship, than all the slaughter, rape, and torture)169 broke out that the
Japanese government sought to exert damage control by concealing the
extent and nature of the atrocities committed, and to replace the shocking
news with propaganda.170
The Rape of Nanking unfolded in the international spotlight.
Months before, and during the actual siege, media correspondents
provided vivid, up-to-date coverage of the events.171 The three American
journalists most influential in forming public opinion were New York
165
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Times reporter, Frank Tillman Durdin; Chicago Daily News’ Archibald
Steele; and the Associated Press’ C. Yates McDaniel.172 All three men
were not only instrumental to writing riveting stories about the events, but
also became actively involved in saving Chinese lives and retrieving body
parts of relatives whom the Japanese had murdered. 173 In addition,
Universal Studios’ Norman Alley and Fox Movietone’s Eric Mayell
happened to be on board the ill-fated U.S.S. Panay, and managed to
squirrel away footage of the action; the film was initially buried in mud,
and later retrieved and played in theaters across the United States.174
Furthermore, not only had the events occurred in full view of the Japanese
Embassy in Nanking, but also, the International Committee had visited the
Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Embassy, to file reports, and
even purportedly filing two protests a day for the first six weeks of the
Nanking Occupation.175
Given the extent of the coverage, it is difficult to believe that the
Japanese Emperor and the royal family were completely unaware of the
extent and brutal nature of the slaughter. Nevertheless, Matsui Iwane, the
commander of Japan’s Central China Expeditionary Force, assumed
complete responsibility for the Nanking atrocities.176 Chang conjectures
that the “tubercular,” “sickly” and “frail” Matsui had simply been a
(willing) scapegoat as he was not even in Nanking when the city fell into
Japanese hands.177 Furthermore, Matsui’s testimony, at the Tokyo IMT
had significant gaps, and was contradictory. “[H]e waffled between lies
and occasional self-denunciation. He tried to make excuses . . . sometimes
denied [the atrocities] completely . . . and [engaged in] . . . circuitous,
vaguely mystical discussions about Buddhism and the nature of SinoJapanese friendship.”178 In addition, the self-flagellating Matsui erected,
in his hometown of Atami, close to Tokyo, a shrine of remorse—a statue
of Kannon, Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, sculpted from clay imported
from the Yangtze River mingled with Japanese soil.179 To atone further,
the Matsui family hired a priestess to chant prayers and weep for the dead
Chinese. 180 Nevertheless, Matsui never pointed a finger at the royal
family, saying only that the tragedy occurred because of his failure to
guide Prince Asaka and the Emperor, and that it was his duty to die for
them.181
172
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Despite the strong indirect proof that the royal family most likely
was aware of, and sanctioned, the brutalities committed by the Japanese
military in Nanking,182 both Prince Asaka and Emperor Hirohito never
spent a day in jail, and lived on to “enjoy lives of leisure and national
adoration.”183 Another shameful legacy of the Tokyo IMT is that whereas
many of the Japanese torturers were awarded full military pensions and
benefits from the Japanese government, “thousands of their victims
suffered (and continue to suffer) lives of silent poverty, shame, or chronic
physical and mental pain.” 184 That relegation to silence has been
described as a “second rape,” not by Japan, but by the colluding Allied
powers.185
B. Attempting to Obliterate Traces of Comfort Stations and
Comfort Women
If the Nazis systematized the extermination of Jews through gas
chambers, the Japanese systematized the rape and sexual slavery of
women in territories occupied by the Japanese between 1930-1945
through “comfort stations.”186 These women were sometimes listed as
“war supplies;”187 in other accounts, they were referred to as “girl armies,”
which is appropriate, as 80% of the reported Korean comfort women were
between fourteen to eighteen years old.188 The statistical data, gathered
through hotlines set up in 1992 to gather data on these military barracks of
sexual slavery, conjures up an efficient and vast machinery for shipping
women, under the jurisdiction and supervision of Japan’s Ministry of
War,189 comparable to the Nazi bureaucracy of sending Jews to death
camps:
Among the Tokyo callers, who were the most numerous,
79 referred to comfort stations in China, 56 to Manchuria,
36 to Southeast Asia, 22 to the Western Pacific, 23 to
Japan and 6 to Korea. In Kyoto, 65 callers referred to
China, . . . 4 to Korea, 2 to New Guinea, . . . 4 to . . .
[Indonesia], 8 to the Philippines, 3 to Burma and 2 each to
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Malaya, Thailand,
Taiwan . . . .190

French

Indochina,

Japan

and

The wide range of nationalities represented in the “girl army”
showed how ruthlessly and systematically women of all nationalities who
came under Japanese control were duped, abducted or violently forced to
become sex slaves:191 Korean, Taiwanese, “Manchus” (meaning nonChinese ethnic groups), mainland Chinese, Indonesians, Vietnamese,
Filipinas, Dutch, Burmese, Malays, White Russians (in Manchuria), Thai,
and also, interestingly, Japanese.192 In addition, the ratio of troops to
comfort women is staggering, and reveals an estimate of the total enslaved
population. The “ideal” ratio (of troops to comfort women) would have
been 29:1 (meaning each soldier would have access to sex every day),193
but the actual ratio, based on studies, is closer to 50:1,194 leading to the
following calculation: “If we assume a ratio of 50:1, then the total of
some 7 million troops from all theatres of war indicates that there would
have been about 139,000 comfort women at most.”195
One justification for the creation of these barracks of sexual
slavery was that it would theoretically prevent the Japanese army from
engaging in an unmitigated spree of rapes,196 as had happened at Nanking.
Sadly, the establishment of the comfort stations did not stop rape in any of
the occupied territories. 197 Not only did the creation of the comfort
stations engender an officially sanctioned system of sexual violence; in
addition, it also strengthened a culture of permissiveness, because
punishments for rape remained lenient in the Japanese Army Penal
Code.198 Looting, combined with rape, though, was another matter, as the
punishment for the combined offense, according to Paragraph Two,
Article 86 of the Army Penal Code: “at least seven years of penal
servitude and at most lifetime imprisonment.”199 To escape the combined
charge, rapists simply killed their victims, and military commanders
looked the other way, viewing rape as a means for “building troop
morale.”200
The other goal, in building comfort stations, was to prevent
Japanese soldiers from becoming infected with sexually transmitted
190
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diseases, knowing that soldiers used sex as a release from the stress and
trauma of war;201 even more importantly, if the infected soldiers returned
home and spread the diseases in their home country, a health pandemic
would emerge.202 As a small sample of the problem, the number of
soldiers of the 19th and 20th Divisions of the North China Area Army, who
had contracted sexually transmitted diseases came to 985.203 To stem the
tide of diseases, the military banned the use of civilian prostitutes and
gave strict and detailed instructions on the best way to avail of the comfort
stations, including an injunction presuming that every comfort woman is a
carrier of sexually transmitted diseases.204 Thus, elaborate instructions
were issued, which included checking for the woman’s health papers
(proving she had recently been inspected for sexually transmitted
diseases); making the woman wash before sex; always using a condom
and a disinfecting lubricant; disinfecting immediately after intercourse;
stopping by the medical office for treatment especially with signs of early
infection, among others.205 Given the complexity of these instructions, it
is highly doubtful that the soldiers actually followed them, and thus, it is
hardly surprising that instead of decreasing the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases, ironically, the comfort stations actually facilitated the
spread of these diseases.206
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Japanese government very
deliberately designed the comfort stations to fit into loopholes in
international law, prohibiting the trafficking in women and girls. There
were four international treaties in force at that time: (i) The International
Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904),207 (ii) The
International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic
(1910),208 (iii) The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic
in Women and Children (1921),209 and (iv) The International Convention
for the Suppression of Traffic in Adult Women and Girls (1933). 210
Although Japan did not sign the 1933 treaty, by 1925 it was a signatory to
the other three, all of which outlawed the prostitution of underage girls,
even with their consent, and rendered criminal the use of violence,
compulsion, or fraud in forcing a woman “of age” to become a
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prostitute.211 However, there was a major loophole in the three treaties:
they exempted colonies from their prohibitions. For example, Article 11
of the 1910 treaty presumed in the absence of a writing to the contrary that
none of the treaty’s prohibitions applied to signatories’ colonies. 212
Similarly, Article 14 of the 1921 treaty allowed signatories to declare their
colonies exempt from treaty provisions.213
Given these loopholes, the Japanese government considered
Korea, Taiwan, China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region—all
occupied territories, and therefore colonies—as exempt from prohibitions
against the trafficking and prostitution of girls.214 That to some extent
explains the proliferation of comfort stations in the occupied territories,
especially in Korea. The Japanese tried to prevent the occupied territories
from uniting in rebellion, and exploited regional tensions to maintain
control. Korea, unlike Taiwan, was historically antagonistic to China, and
its population easier to isolate.215 As a consequence of cultural prejudices
and Japanese exploitation of regional tensions, Korean women suffered
more than most. In terms of ethnic status, in the eyes of the Japanese, they
were desirable because they ranked as most akin and were second only to
Japanese and Okinawan women. After them in the pecking order came
the Chinese, and lastly Southeast Asians, who were darker-skinned and
thus not as desirable.216 Finally, because Japan never ratified the 1933
treaty, which explicitly prohibited rounding up women and forcing them
to become prostitutes, even with the woman’s consent, it could technically
claim that it had broken no international laws.217 However, given the
already existing widespread international consensus regarding the
prohibition, embodied in treaties, it could be argued that Japan flagrantly
violated an effectively existing international custom.218
Ultimately, the Japanese military was just as guilty as the Nazis
were of “crimes against humanity”—defined by the Nuremberg IMT as
“murders, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,”
as well as “persecutions on political or racial grounds.”219 However, at the
Tokyo IMT, “not even one person was tried for crimes against
211
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humanity.”220 The reasons for why Japan was not prosecuted for its
sexual enslavement of women in its occupied territories, among other
crimes, are manifold. Not only were rape victims reluctant to come
forward because of shame,221 but also Japan, the Allied powers and even
other Asian nations colluded, to render these crimes “resolved” through a
“political solution.”
Eager to attract or maintain Japanese development aid and
investment, the postwar governments of Asian nations
colonized or occupied by Japan during the war have often
been reluctant to press issues of Japan’s responsibilities to
its victims. Not only the Japanese but other Asian
governments as well would just as soon forget, for
different but complementary reasons, that comfort women
ever existed.222
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Nuancing what appears, from the view of historical distance, to be
an unproblematic blanket of collusion, Yuma Totani223 argues that “the
Allied prosecutors—and in particular, the Dutch member—substantiated
the Japanese commission of various forms of sexual violence including
sexual slavery, targeted . . . at the Asian female population.”224 Repeatedly,
Totani points to documentary traces of the prosecution’s attention (or at
least non-dismissal) of sexual violence perpetrated against Asian women.
For example, “rape and other acts of physical abuse” were among the
fifteen general patterns of Japanese war crimes appended to the
indictment; 225 in addition, during the trial, the prosecutors supplied
additional evidence about other types of war crimes, implied in but not
specifically identified in the indictment, such as civilian-targeted atrocities,
including “deportation and use of numerous Asian civilians as slave
laborers.” 226 Nevertheless, Totani does point out that this extensive
documentation did not cover the Korean and Taiwanese comfort women,
but instead focused on “military sexual slavery targeted to women of
enemy nationalities, such as Chinese, Dutch, Indonesian and Vietnamese
women.”227 Although she does not develop the idea, Totani points to the
liminal status of Koreans and Taiwanese—from the perspective of the
Allied forces, they were both victims (forced to serve the Japanese) and
victimizers (who had assisted in Japan’s aggression and atrocities),228
unlike the other Asian nationalities, who were clearly regarded as
“enemies” of Japan. Ultimately she arrives at the same conclusion: “As
history shows, Allied prosecutors did not explore th[e] possibility [of
prosecuting this systematic sexualized violence against women in the
Japanese colonies] and ultimately failed to hold Japanese leaders
accountable for organized sexual slavery.” She concurs that “this
unfortunate omission can be validly considered as one major historical
shortcoming of the Tokyo Trial.”229
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V. THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CASE OF THE COMFORT
WOMEN: ATTEMPTING TO GO BEYOND FORGETTING
Although this article focused initially on the historical, political,
and legal dimensions of the papering over of Japan’s wartime crimes of
violence against women, cultural dimensions are also part of the picture.
For example, Japanese soldiers widely believed that sex before battle
provided a charm against injury.230 Thus, soldiers wore amulets made
from the pubic hairs or from the possessions of comfort women. 231
Conversely, sexual deprivation was believed to make one accident-prone,
probably because of the lack of stress-relief, given the savage training the
Japanese military underwent. 232 And since an army’s strength is no
greater than that of its weakest link, there was a great deal of pressure for
soldiers to visit comfort stations; men who resisted were forced by their
own comrades.233 The soldiers’ favorite victims were hua gu niang234—
young girls—because virgins were supposed to provide particularly potent
protection. Yet as the Nanking Massacre shows, all women (and even
men) were targeted for rape: women in their eighties were not spared,
pregnant women about to go into labor were violated and their fetuses
slashed from their wombs for amusement, preteen girls had their vaginas
slashed to rape them more effectively, and fathers and husbands were
forced to witness the rapes of their kin before being forced to rape them as
well and then finally killed. 235 As one Japanese psychiatrist, First
Lieutenant Hayao Torao noted, in his report on “Phenomena Particular to
the Battlefield and Policies Toward Them,” and in specific on “Sexual
Desire and Rape”: “Because the idea that [soldiers] are free to do things
to enemy women that would never be permitted at home is extremely
widely held, when they see young Chinese women, they are drawn to
them as if possessed.”236
Of course, a phenomenon as complex as the Japanese comfort
stations is not reducible to a simple excuse for unmitigated “Japan
bashing.” For example, the Japanese simply exploited pre-existing gender
and class discrimination within Korean society to target young, poor
women.237 Nor were all relationships between the Japanese soldiers and
their “girl army” necessarily completely devoid of tenderness, or
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sometimes even real concern.238 And the Japanese were not unique, in
their use of prostitution, as a way to relieve the psychological pressures of
war and strengthen “troop morale.”239
As the rape centers set up by Serbian forces during the
Yugoslavian civil war demonstrate, rape as a military weapon and as a
means of subjugation remains viable and is not a World War II relic.
Although the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and for Rwanda have successfully indicted numerous individuals on
charges of torture and genocide for crimes that entail sexual violence
against women, and the statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
clearly outline rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity, these
courts have jurisdiction only over crimes post-dating the Rome Treaty’s
signing in July 1998.240 Former comfort women, and other victims of
imperial Japan, therefore have no international legal recourse against their
victimizers or against the Japanese government, 241 given Japan’s
recalcitrant denial of any wrongdoing save for a public apology, issued in
July 1992.242 Although comfort stations’ survivors have engaged in an
activism that has raised an awareness concerning systematic rape and
sexual slavery during armed conflict, 243 these former comfort women
“have yet to receive a yen of compensation from the Japanese
government.”244 Particularly given the virulent racism with which the
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when invading the Netherlands with an armada, was accompanied by “400 mounted
whores and 800 on foot.” Id. at 29.
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Id. at 19.
241
See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of an Alien
Torts Statute action against Japan litigated by fifteen former comfort women from China,
the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, because of the possible adverse effect on U.S.
foreign relations with Japan, China, and Korea). See also HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1213–15 (3d ed. 2008) (1996).
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Id. at 264.
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See, e.g., Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and
Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 50th
Sess., ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (by Gay J. McDougall,
Special
Rapporteur),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (remarking in a United Nations report that comfort women’s
activism provided a “significant impetus” for the commissioning of the report, and
advocating that systematic sexual violence against women be prosecuted as a crime against
humanity).
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HICKS, supra note 186, at 271.
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Japanese were portrayed during World War II,245 it is surprising how
easily that collective animosity became effaced, replaced by a diplomatic
final solution, dressed in legal trappings. Although forgetting is often part
of the process of working through trauma, in the case of the Tokyo IMT,
an artificially imposed collective amnesia simply worked, ironically, to
generate even more complex mechanisms of denial and guilt, in the
Japanese, and thus, as a corollary, a problematic heritage of shame and
denunciation, for the Tokyo IMT.246

VI. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS MILITARY STRATEGY AND
CULTURAL MYTH: THE EVOLUTION OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
WARS
Anne Llewelyn Barstow uses statistics to frame a contrastive
analysis of the casualties of war during World War I, to wars that followed
in its wake. “[I]n World War I, the ratio of military personnel killed to
civilians killed was 8:1; in World War II it was 1:1; in the many smaller
wars since 1945, the ratio has been 1:8. This means that the victims of
wars have changed: the great majority being civilians, they are now
mainly women, children, and the elderly.”247 A crucial strategy in these
new wars is control over women’s sexuality and reproductive ability.248
There are four ways in which women are particularly targeted, within the
context of contemporary military campaigns.
The first is illustrated in the case of the Korean, Taiwanese and
Japanese comfort women. Here, women are kidnapped, held hostage,
gang-raped, and forced into prostitution in rape camps and detention
camps.249 Although the horrifying heritage of Japan’s comfort stations
should have spurred the international community to condemn it as a crime
against humanity, it was left unpunished by the Tokyo IMT; 250 the
practice has been more recently resurrected in the extensive crimes of
sexual abuse and rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 251 The cultural myth
245

For example, the Western Allies frequently described the Japanese as “subhuman,”
often portraying them as “apes and vermin.” JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY:
RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 9 (1986).
246
See Havel, supra note 102, at 648 (stating that collective amnesia is also a problem with
regard to the Holocaust and Nuremberg trials).
247
Anne Llewelyn Barstow, Introduction to WAR’S DIRTY SECRET: RAPE, PROSTITUTION,
AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN 3 (Anne Llewelyn Barstow ed., 2000).
248
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights in ARE WOMEN
HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 180, 181 (2006).
249
HICKS, supra note 186, at 17.
250
YOSHIAKI, supra note 189, at 162.
251
See Contemporary Forms of Slavery, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum.
Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess.,
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/38 (July 13, 1995) (by Linda Chavez), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1995.38.En (last
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behind this strategy is that men, unless they are allowed to rape within
secure conditions, will engage in dangerous raping sprees, or
surreptitiously sneak off to brothels, engaging in dangerous sex with
infected prostitutes.252 Iris Chang notes that the Japanese high command
organized the vast network of comfort stations, after the scandal of the
Rape of Nanking, to “prevent further mass rape of conquered populations
with the ensuing world condemnation and control the spread of venereal
disease through the troops as well.”253
Second, rather than a “spontaneous” release, rape is a “strategic”
and systematic endeavor, a military tactic planned and authorized by
higher authorities to serve two purposes: (i) to enhance male bonding,
thus enabling them to become better killing machines, 254 and (ii) to
humiliate and demoralize the enemy through particular cruelty to the
women, seen as “property” of enemy men. 255 Once again, we see
elements of these in the Japanese war crimes of sexual abuse, especially in
the Rape of Nanking,256 where the transformation of “normal” young men
into killing machines practically inured them from guilt and granted them
immense power in dehumanizing their prey. As Azuma Shiro, a former
Japanese soldier remarked, “[p]erhaps when we were raping her we
looked at her as a woman . . . but when we killed her, we just thought of
her as something like a pig.”257 Similarly, Rwandan Hutu genocidaires,
inverting European racialized mythology, dubbed Tutsis “cockroaches”
and their women “serpents.” 258 The Tutsi women were particularly
targeted for violent attack because of their “beauty” (i.e., “Europeanized”
features).

visited Dec. 29, 2011) (reporting to the United Nations on large-scale rape by Serbian
military forces). Scholars have attempted to define and distinguish the various categories
of sexual crime: “Rape denotes vaginal, oral, or anal sexual intercourse without the
consent of one of the people involved. Sexual assault is a broader term, which includes
rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts, as well as mutilation of the genitals. Sexual
violence is the most general term, used to describe any kind of violence carried out through
sexual means or by targeting sexuality.” M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA MCCORMICK,
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (1996).
252
JIN SUNG CHUNG, ILL BON KUK WE AN BU JUNG CHACK EUI HYUNG SUNG KWA
BYUNWHA [THE FORMATION AND CHANGE OF COMFORT WOMEN POLICY IN JAPANESE
HISTORY] 1–2 (1990).
253
Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking in WAR’S DIRTY SECRET: RAPE, PROSTITUTION, AND
OTHER CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN 46 (Anne Llewelyn Barstow ed., 2000).
254
HICKS, supra note 186, at 29.
255
Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield in MASS RAPE: THE WAR
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 181 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994).
256
CHANG, supra note 1, at 49–50.
257
Id. at 48.
258
Laura Flanders, Rwanda’s Living Casualties in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST
WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 97 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994).
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Stereotypes portrayed Tutsi women as arrogant and
deceptive—and sexually special. Fetishized parts of the
Tutsi’s supposedly “European” physiology were singled
out for mutilation: noses, necks, fingers—as well as
genitals. Survivors murmur that their rapists wanted to
“see what Tutsis look like inside.”259
Third, both Serbian commanders 260 and Rwandan political
leaders261 have added, in addition to rape and torture, forced and deliberate
impregnation as a cruel innovation. Specifically, in relation to the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.N. Commission of Experts concluded that
“[t]he practices of ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . sexual assault and rape . . . have
been carried out . . . so systematically that they strongly appear to be the
product of a policy.” 262 Subsequently, the U.N. General Assembly
asserted even more strongly that they were “[c]onvinced that this heinous
practice [rape and violence against women] constitutes a deliberate
weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of ethnic cleansing carried out by
Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and . . . that the abhorrent policy of
ethnic cleansing was a form of genocide.263 Sexual crimes of violence are
used to nation-build, by forcing dispersal of the racially undesired group.
“Rapes spread fear and induce the flight of refugees; rapes humiliate,

259

Id.
Catherine MacKinnon remarks on the inhumanity of filming “[t]his campaign of
expansion through ethnic extermination [that] has included rape, forcible impregnation,
torture, and murder of Muslim and Croatian women, ‘for Serbia.’” Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide in MASS RAPE: THE
WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 73 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994).
261
Laura Flanders states: “The number of pregnancies said to be caused by force suggest
that so-called genocidaires raped 250,000 to 500,000 women and girls in less than one
hundred days.” Flanders, supra note 258, at 96.
262
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), transmitted by letter dated May 27, 1994 from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, ¶ 313; see also
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
263
G.A. Res. 49/205, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/205 (Mar. 6, 1995). See also Further
Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including
the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the
Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Preliminary Report
Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in Accordance with Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1994/45, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess.,
¶ 268, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/75ccfd797b0712d08025670b005c9a7d
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011).
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demoralize, and destroy not only the victim but also her family and
community; and rapes stifle any wish to return.”264
Yet genocidal rape as tied up with forced impregnation has its
origins in an even more insidious cultural myth—one even more
dangerous in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina because even the women—
raped or not—Serbian, Moslem or Christian, believed in it. Not only were
raped women shunned (and rendered ashamed and guilty) because of the
loss of their virginity. 265 Even more devastatingly, if they were
impregnated, because the “thing[s] inside”266 their wombs had the paternal
heritage of the enemy, the babies were therefore regarded as of the same
“race” as the rapist. 267 Such a cultural myth stubbornly refused to
acknowledge the woman’s biological contribution to the creation of a
child, and reduced her, even more, to a vilified, passive vessel of the
enemy’s sperm. Beverly Allen succinctly analyzes the central kernel of
this masculinist and racist myth: “Serb ‘ethnic cleansing’ by means of
rape, enforced pregnancy, and childbirth is based on the uninformed,
hallucinatory fantasy of ultranationalists whose salient characteristic, after
their violence, is their ignorance.”268
Finally, there is one more use of violence against women as a
strategy of war: the kidnapping of women to function as “wives” (i.e.,
slaves) for soldiers, as practiced today in Sudan and by rebels in northern
Uganda.269 In some ways, the comfort women who traveled with the
Japanese Imperial Army served this, among other, functions as well.270
An associated practice, of treating human beings as part of the spoils of
war, is of kidnapping young boys, old enough to work, to be exploited as
slaves.271
Ultimately and ironically, the picture that emerges, in the wake of
the Tokyo IMT’s failure to prosecute for the crimes of violence against the
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comfort women by the Japanese Imperial Army,272 is not a cessation or
even diminishing of such crimes, but their escalation into even more
heinous forms.
The final section of this article reviews the complexities of
prosecuting rape and other crimes of violence against women within the
contemporary context of war; nevertheless, it also examines some of the
ambiguous legal gains, and makes preliminary proposals for how violent
sexual crimes, such as those inflicted on the comfort women, might be
explored.

VII. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING STRATEGIES OF LEGAL REDRESS
FOR WARTIME CRIMES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
In light of the Rome Statute’s grant of jurisdiction to the ICC to
prosecute “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution . . . [and] any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity,”273 rape is now viewed as
a criminal offense both under national and international rules of war.274
Nevertheless, rape and other forms of sexualized violence remain
characterized principally as affronts on personal dignity or crimes against
272

Investigations on Class B and C crimes (conventional war crimes and crimes against
humanity), as opposed to Class A crimes (crimes against peace) were “conducted by the
United States, Britain, Australia, France, Holland, Philippines, China and the Soviet Union,
in their own occupied territory in Asia, based on their own laws and jurisdiction.”
Although these proceedings were plagued by numerous problems, such as the dearth of
interpreters, wrongful arrests, procedural issues, “[m]ore than 55,000 individuals were
taken into custody and 5,700 faced trial as Class B and C criminals. A total of 984 were
sentenced to death, 475 to life imprisonment and 2,944 to limited prison sentences,” not
counting trials by the Soviet Union, which remain uncounted. FUTAMURA, supra note 17,
at 75. However, as Totani pointed out, in relation to military sexual slavery the
prosecution focused on gender violence against women of enemy nationalities, such as
Chinese, Dutch, Indonesian, and Vietnamese women, not colonial subjects, such as Korean
and Taiwanese women. TOTANI, supra note 224, at 14.
273
Id. at 157.
274
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (protecting the “person
[and] honour” of civilians, requiring that they be treated “humanely” and without
discrimination, and that specifically they be protected against “[v]iolence . . . [o]utrages
upon personal dignity . . . rape, enforced prostitution . . . [and] [s]lavery”); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75–76, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (prohibiting “[o]utrages upon personal dignity . . .
enforced prostitution . . . [and] rape,” and providing for “special respect” and treatment of
female prisoners, particularly those pregnant or with infants); Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3(I)(a), (c), 27, 76, 97, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (prohibiting,
inter alia, “outrages upon personal dignity” and “attack[s] on [female] honour, in
particular . . . rape [or] enforced prostitution,” and providing for respectful treatment of
female detainees and internees).
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honor275 in contrast with “pure” crimes of violence, such as murder and
torture. As a result of this binary distinction (wartime crimes against
dignity and honor versus wartime crimes of violence), rape is set apart
from the more violent crimes, and either suffers from masculinist/sexist
dimensions (rape as a violation of a man’s honor), or causes women to
internalize these same value systems (as requiring the violation of a
virgin). Thus, the key issue, in terms of seeking justice in international
forums for these wartime sexualized crimes of violence, is whether rape
and other forms of sexualized assault can qualify as what are termed
“grave breaches,” because such breaches give rise to universal jurisdiction,
which means:
[E]very nation has an obligation to bring the perpetrators
to justice through investigating, arresting and prosecuting
offenders in its own courts or extraditing them to more
appropriate forums.
The existence of universal
jurisdiction also provides a legal rationale for trying such
crimes before an international tribunal and for the
obligation of states to cooperate.276
Part of the problem, however, is that the Geneva Conventions do not
itemize rape as a grave breach of international law. 277 Grave breaches are
defined as “wil[l]ful killing, torture or inhumane treatment” and
“wil[l]fully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.”278
275

See, e.g., id. at art. 27, ¶ 2 (“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on
their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault.”); Protocol II, supra note 274, art. 4.
276
Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in
Time of War in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 201
(Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994).
277
Cf. Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture in TORTURE 307, 308 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2004) (“[The] Geneva Conventions were written . . . [to deter] the kind of
barbaric treatment of civilians that had become so apparent . . . during the Second World
War . . . by promising combatants who treated noncombatants well that they themselves
would be treated according to a code of dignity if captured . . . [but] would be denied the
protections of that code if they broke the laws of war and abused civilians themselves.”).
Although rape might be classified as a form of torture, there is thus a military focus to the
Conventions that may have led its drafters to overlook detailed protection of female
civilian. Cf. John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and
Abroad in TORTURE 145, 147 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (“[T]he United Nation’s Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials says that the phrase [‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’] ‘should be interpreted . . . [broadly] against abuses,
whether physical or mental.’ International tribunals have given additional content to these
definitions . . . . Rape . . . [is] torture as well.”).
278
See Protocol I, supra note 274, art. 85(1), (3), (5) (extending the treatment of “grave
breaches” in the Geneva Conventions to the Protocol, defining all “grave breaches” as war
crimes, and specifically forbidding willful attacks on civilians); Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 274, arts. 146–47 (requiring that contracting parties enact legislation to punish
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While military campaigns have evolved to include rape, sexual
slavery and forced impregnation as forms of torture and genocide,
international law has not sufficiently evolved to recognize that rape has
become a form of torture, within the context of war.279 Indeed, despite the
strong condemnation of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the United Nations’
interpretation of whether rape constitutes a grave breach of humanitarian
law for the purposes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia is ambiguous. For example, the U.N. Human Rights
Commission’s sharp condemnation of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia
characterized the practice as a war crime “in the circumstances,” 280
implying that it is only within such severe circumstances that rape and
sexual abuse can rise to the level of being a war crime. Similarly, the
Declaration of the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna,
despite its strong wording, reserved such censure for “systematic” rape
and abuse. 281 Even though the report declines to recognize rape as a
“grave breach” giving rise to universal jurisdiction, it does recognize that
rape and forced prostitution can rise to the level of a “crime against
humanity.” For example, Article 2 itemizes as grave breaches “(a)
wil[l]ful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; (c) wil[l]fully causing great suffering or serious . . . injury to
body or health.”282
Although much still needs to be done to bring international law’s
characterization of what is a “grave breach” more in conjunction with the
evolution of contemporary wartime strategies of brutalization, there is
evidence of some evolution in international law between the CAT
convention and the Rome Treaty, broadening the reach of this label to
cover more categories of rape and sexual violence. In particular, this trend
is evident in evolving law on sexual torture as developed in some ad hoc
tribunals established during the Rwandan and Yugoslav conflicts.283 In
such “grave breaches” “if committed against persons or property protected by the present
Convention”).
279
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace in ARE WOMEN HUMAN?
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 141 (2006).
280
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Hum. Rts. Res. 1993/8, 49th Sess., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/8 (Feb. 23, 1993),
available
at
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(last visited Dec. 29, 2011).
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(Oct.
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the Akayesu case, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda compared rape to torture, finding that often it “is used for such
purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination,
punishment, control or destruction of a person,” and observing that “the
central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical
description of objects and body parts.”284 The Court noted that rape is not
defined under international law, but proposed that it should be understood
as part of a broader class of crimes of “sexual violence,” which would
include “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive.”285 The Court notably refused to limit
its definition of sexual violence to acts involving physical penetration.286
Subsequently, this groundbreaking recognition—that rape and sexualized
violence cannot be reduced to mere physical penetration—was reinforced
by the Muhimana case, which focused on the coercive power of group
force within the context of genocide.287
A further possible strategy for redress for victims of such crimes
is to characterize them as crimes against humanity, a legal category first
formulated in the Charter and the Judgment of the Nuremberg Trial.288
Like grave breaches, crimes of humanity also give rise to universal
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 339,
343–50 (reviewing the facts of the Celebi, Furundzija and Kunarac cases in relation to the
Rome Statute’s characterization of torture as “an act where there is a knowing infliction of
severe pain and suffering, whether physical and mental;” which can be “committed by a
State or a non-State actor;” and which requires that “the victim of torture . . . be in custody
or under the control of the perpetrator”)
284
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, art. 7.7 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc15154.pdf (noting “the cultural sensitivities
involved in public discussion of intimate matters and recall[ing] the painful reluctance and
inability of witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of sexual violence they
endured”).
285
Id.
286
See id. (“Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”).
287
See The Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, ¶ 546
(Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc64965.pdf, aff’d, Mikaeli Muhimana
v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Judgment, art. XIX (May 21, 2007),
http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/20070521-jgt-951B-01-en.pdf (“[C]oercion is an element
that may obviate . . . consent . . . in the crime of rape. . . . [M]ost cases charged under
international law, as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, will be
almost universally coercive.”); see also Hirondelle Press Agency, ICTR/Muhimana—
Prosecutor Says that Killings in Kibuye Were “Intimate Murders,” Mar. 29, 2004,
available at http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/991/287; ICTR/Muhimana—
Muhimana Gets Life Sentence for Mutiple Rapes in Rwanda Genocide, May 2, 2005,
available at http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/2325/287.
288
See Report of the Int’l L. Comm’n to the G.A., Int’l L. Comm’n, 2nd Sess., 374–78, U.N.
Doc.
A/1316
(June
5
to
July
29,
1950),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a_cn4_34.pdf (“formulat[ing]” and commenting
upon “the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal”).
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jurisdiction, but do not rely on treaties, and are immune from the question
of whether an international conflict or a civil war is involved.289 Indeed,
both rape and forced prostitution are recognized as “crimes against
humanity” in the report establishing the statute of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 290 The report defines crimes of
humanity as “inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as willing
killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial,
or religious grounds.”291 While this is an advance, the description of rape
is thus very similar to its characterization in relation to a “grave breach”—
that it is only when rape is extreme and unusual that is rises to the
heinousness of being a crime against humanity. Theoretically, such a
view makes analytic sense, but in terms of the pragmatic picture of
contemporary warfare, and its deployment of rape as a strategy of
persecution, the distinction between a “normal” rape and a “genocidal”
rape seems moot.292
Perhaps the U.S. Alien Tort Act is an additional legal mechanism
that victims of such sexualized crimes could use, as it has been used in
relation to apprehending and indicting atrocities related to Rwanda and
Bosnia.293 The Alien Tort Act gives U.S. district courts jurisdiction over
suits filed by aliens alleging torts committed anywhere in violation of the
law of nations.294 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala295 established a three-pronged
test: (i) the alien must sue, (ii) the suit must be in tort, and (iii) the tort
must have been done in violation of the law of nations.296 Ironically, this
formerly obscure law has been instrumental to seeking justice in the
Rwandan and Bosnian cases. And as Susan Shin points out, it was
theoretically possible that Alien Tort Statute could also have been
deployed to seek long-delayed justice for the comfort women.
The Korean [and other] comfort women satisfy all three
prongs [of the Filartiga test], as they are aliens suing the
Japanese government for the violation of an
internationally
recognized
norm
of
customary
international law prohibiting military sexual slavery.
While rape was officially absent from international
treaties at the close of World War II, the prohibition
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against slavery was well established at that time, therefore
granting the comfort women standing under the Act.297

Unfortunately, in October 2001, a U.S. court dismissed a case
brought by former Korean comfort women, because it found the Japanese
government to have immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA).298 Specifically, the court rejected the argument that Japan’s
organizing of the comfort stations fell into the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA as well as the argument that because of a jus cogens
violation, Japan had lost its immunity.299 Perhaps, as Shin points out,
individual criminals could still be prosecuted, even if the suit against the
Japanese government failed.300
An alternative to this implicit demand for an immediate and
conclusive litigated resolution of comfort women’s claims might be found
in a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—assuming creation of such an
institution were feasible. Where such mechanisms have succeeded, as in
South Africa, they have addressed not only individual claims but at least
part of the historical trauma and suffering that these typically leave
behind.301 However, the South African example seemed to have worked
well largely because of its timing—as a form of transitional justice, when,
for a brief period, there was popular support for the view that “amnesty
was the price for allowing a relatively peaceful transition to full
democracy.” 302 Yet as Martha Minow also points out, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions are “less compatible where the victimized
group has been expelled or so decimated that it has no nation in which to
reconcile and rebuild. 303 Moreover, the distance in time separating
survivors from the events suffered, and likewise, their effective
geographic distance, for the most part, from the society of the perpetrators,
mean that “Truth and Conciliation” is still not a viable solution.
In contrast, however, Amy Palmer remarks that in Sierra Leone
the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission . . . has shown the world how
successful open communication regarding widespread [sexual]
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victimization can be.”304 In the ten-year war that left 75,000 dead,305
forced marriage was routinely used to subjugate women of the opposing
side, who were held hostage and systematically raped. This was distinct
from the shorter-term modes of rape common in Rwandan and
Yugoslavia.306 As Palmer notes, there is a distinction between sexual
slavery and forced marriage, as the types of “conjugal duties” that the
“bush wives” were forced to bear were not exclusively sexual, but in some
ways a bush wife’s forced status as a “wife” was even worse, because of
the external pressure reinforcing the coercion that she stay with her
“husband” (especially when there were children from the “marriage”).307
Like the Sierra Leone “wives” who were branded by their captors, their
chests carved with the letters “RUF” or “ARC” (which made escape
harder, as these signs were interpreted as indicating allegiance to the rebel
cause, making them vulnerable to attacks),308 the comfort women were
“branded” by their experiences of having been comfort women, often
unable to reintegrate back into society and sometimes rendered sterile.
As the violent Sierra Leonean civil war unfolded, sexual violence,
perpetrated by various factions, broke out on a massive scale.
Mysteriously, however, it went almost unreported in the media, as the
international community attended almost exclusively to the more widelyreported issue of forced amputation. 309 In addition to falling below the
radar of the international media and the conscience of the world
community, the experience of the bush wives of Sierra Leone evokes other
similarities to the plight of the comfort women. In both cases, there is the
use of coercion to make the captured woman a “wife,” or a relatively
permanent companion—or sometimes, less flatteringly, a type of “war
supply.” Bush wives, like the comfort women, also discovered after their
war had ended that their plight had not, due to the lingering stigma of
“having been married to a rebel and having assisted in rebel activities,”
which made return to family and community difficult.310 As a striking
304
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indication of this harsh reality, many of the “bush wives” have remained
together with their captors even to the present day.311
In this context of such stigma, trauma and loss, Palmer provides
an intriguing account of how at least some victims were able to achieve
legal redress through the mechanism of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.312 In addition, Palmer provides a striking account of how
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission facilitated exchanges between
victims and perpetrators that allowed “genuine healing and reconciliation”
to occur.313 Most importantly to this discussion about ways of achieving
legal redress, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
recognized not only sexual slavery but also forced marriage as a crime
against humanity.314 Though several key defendants were acquitted of this
charge, Palmer notes that the Court has set an “important precedent for
future prosecution of gender-based crimes in both ad hoc tribunals and the
permanent ICC.”315
As international human rights law continues to develop, even the
comfort women or their heirs may eventually attain some form of legal
redress. Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which covers crimes against
humanity—and which delineates the reach of the ICC’s prosecutorial
jurisdiction in such cases—clearly covers crimes of forced marriage, and
authorizes prosecution for “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity.”316 In light of more recent conflicts and
continuing humanitarian violations, perhaps the real heritage of the
comfort women is less a history of collective amnesia than a history of
attempting to work through the trauma of sexual slavery—a process that
continues today. Such a process is far from simple because “working
through” trauma (an act of analysis that produces interpretations allowing
for responsible control) cannot be sharply delineated from its pathological
twin of “acting out” trauma, or repetitively rehearsing it.317 But it is a
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process we must continually challenge ourselves to undertake lest we
forget not only our history but our humanity.
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